• Property₁ = that which imparts on an individual thing its particular nature (property as token), and
• Property₂ = that which makes distinct things the same (property as type).

For now, if mental properties₁ are tropes, they can be identified with physical properties₁. Mental properties₂ can still be distinguished from physical properties₂, for properties considered as types are-in line with the standard view of tropes-identified with similarity classes of tropes. When Lisa removes her hand from the stove because she feels pain, therefore, she removes her hand in virtue of something that is partly characterized by a trope which is such that it belongs to a class of mentally similar tropes. This trope is identical with a physical trope-it is both mental and physical-because it also belongs to a (distinct) similarity class of physically similar tropes. Therefore, mental properties can be causally relevant in spite of the fact that the mental is multiply realizable by the physical, and in spite of the fact that we live in a physically closed and non-overdetermined universe.

This tip could have been criticized. According to Noordhof (1998: 223) it fails because it will not esteem new “fat regarding carpet limitation”. For the moment issue that was ambiguously inquired about features, might be unambiguously asked about tropes: is-it when you look at the advantage of being intellectual or in advantage out of being real your trope is causally related on the effect (for a response, cf. Continue reading →